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Protecting Individual Rights

Who Should Liveor Die?
Who Should Decide?
Editor's Note: YaleKamisar, the Henrv
K Ransom proftssor of law at the University
of Michigan Law School, is the author of
numerous books and articles on criminal justice as well as articles on euthanasia. TRIAL
asked Proftssor Kamisar questions on legal
and ethical issues surrounding the right to
die, a subject attracting increasing interest
across the country and around the world.

lieve that passive euthanasia should be
tainted by that movement. We should
not withdraw or withhold life support
when we know full well that that course
of action will bring about death-indeed,
when our very purpose is to achieve that
result-unless we are willing to accept
responsibility for what we are really
doing. Perhaps passive euthanasia should
be permitted in some cases, but only
What is the difference between active when direct, straightforward euthanasia
and passive euthanasia?
would be.
This question has long been the
I have considered the arguments made
subject of widespread and spirited de- by proponents of the active/passive eubate by lawyers, doctors, philosophers, thanasia distinction for a long time. I
and ethicists. One group of commenta- must say I do not find them persuasive.
tors believes that the distinction between We are told, for example, that removing
active and passive euthanasia is a crucial the ban against euthanasia would be to
one. But another group of commenta- "embrace the assumption that one hutors has belittled the distinction, main- man being has the power of life over
taining that it is morally evasive and dis- another." (New York State Task Force on
ingenuous to condemn positive acts of Life and the La~ Life-Sustaining Treateuthanasia and yet approve negative strat- ment 42 (1987).) But withholding or
egies designed to achieve the same pur- withdrawing life-sustaining treatment
pose. I agree with the second group.
embraces that very assumption.
Over the years, some proponents of
We are also told by a group favoring
euthanasia, such as the late Dr. Joseph passive euthanasia in certain circumstances
Fletcher, the noted Protestant ethicist, that maintaining the prohibition against
have attacked the distinction, but many active euthanasia "prevents the grave
of his allies have sought to preserve it. potential for abuse inherent in any law
They are well aware that the public is that sanctions the taking of human life."
much more ready and willing to accept (Id.) But passive euthanasia, at the very
"letting die" than "killing" (even when least, presents the same potential for
it is in "mercy").
abuse.
Indeed, I would go further. I would
Unlike many proponents of the right
to die, who deem it important to main- say that because of the repugnance surtain the distinction so that passive eu- rounding active euthanasia-because it
thanasia not be tainted in any way by is what might be called straightforward
the active euthanasia movement, I be- or "out-in-the-open" euthanasia-it is
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probably less likely to be abused than
less readily recognizable forms of passive
euthanasia.
Will you elaborate with an example?
Many Down's syndrome newborns
have been "allowed to die" through failure to remove an intestinal blockage or
otherwise perform relatively simple surgery. Very few would have died if parents and physicians had had to consent
to lethal injection rather than starvation
or dehydration as the method of death.
Very few of these newborn babies would
have died if parents and physicians had
been unable to deny what they had really
done-if they had had to accept the
responsibility for "killing" rather than
"letting die."
I want to make one thing quite clear.
I do not favor active euthanasia. Rather
I am greatly troubled by the degree to
which passive euthanasia has gained acceptance. My purpose in debunking the
active/passive distinction is to get us to
re-examine what we have been doing
passively or negatively and to feel more
uncomfortable about it.
But others who dismiss the distinction
have a very different purpose. Convinced
that negative or passive euthanasia is a
fait accompli in modern medicine, this
group is trying to belittle the active/
passive distinction to get more doctors
(and others) to engage in active euthanasia and to feel more comfortable about
it. They are making a lot of headway,
as the strong support for Washington
state's "Death with Dignity" Initiative

Gregory Nemec

119 illustrates. The initiative didn't pass,
but until the last few weeks of the campaign it was supported by large majorities. In the ncar future voters in other
states will be asked to vote on similar
proposals. The way things are going, by
the year 2001 proponents of euthanasia
will succeed, at least in some states.
Iflaw and ethics were entirely syllogistic, it would be hard to distinguish between active and passive euthanasia. But
we can't overlook the psychological effect-the symbolic impact-oflegalizing
active euthanasia. In a speech I gave
some years ago, I said that passive euthanasia had gained so much acceptance

that our "official morality" -the prohibition against euthanasia-had become
"a woefully outflanked Maginot Line."
But that doesn't mean we shouldn't
grieve over the fall of the Maginot Line.
When you erase the distinction between
letting die or dying a natural death and
direct killing, the Maginot Line falls.
Is the distinction between active and
passive euthanasia likely to be preserved in the future?
I don't think so. In recent years I've
talked to a great many people about this
subject. Although they differ widely on
other aspects of this problem, almost
TRIAL DECEMBER 1991

everybody seems to agree on one point:
Sooner or later the distinction will disappear-active euthanasia will "collapse"
into passive euthanasia-and both forms
of euthanasia will become widely
acceptable.
We moved a significant step in that
direction in recent years, when most
courts and most bioethicists rejected any
distinction between turning off the respirator and removing the feeding tube.
In the 1960s and 1970s that distinction
was deemed important. Recall that Karen
Quinlan's parents did not request permission to remove the feeding tube that
was to keep their daughter alive for an21

,..............other nine years. If they had, they prob- to avoid the conclusions that we have
ably would have been rebuffed.
made a quality-of-life judgment and that
But the law and medical opinion moved the removal of life support rather than
very quickly in the decade and a half the underlying illness brought about the
since the QJtinlan case was decided. In patient's death.
a relatively short time, theright-to-die
movement was powerful enough to over- If Washington state voters had apride the once-formidable distinction proved "Death with Dignity" Initiabetween terminating artificial nutrition tive 119 in November, they would have
and hydration and ending other forms legalized voluntary euthanasia only
of life support. As a result of this, the for the tenninally ill-those who have
psychological distinction between killing six months or less to live-who make
and letting die was significantly under- a written request to die. Is a renninmined.
ally ill limitation very important?
Yes, but if the proposal had been apDefine "dying" and "tenninally ill."
How are these tenns different from
"persistent vegetative state" (PVS)?
I can>t think of a problem
The terms dying and terminally ill
that raises more
have been used very loosely. One reason
is that those who favor refusing or withfundamental moral>
drawing life-sustaining treatment find it
political, and legal
good strategy to characterize the patient
questions than euthanasia.
as dying or terminally ill. This positions
them to say that removing or withholding life support is not terminating a life
but merely preventing the "drawing out" proved, I don't think the distinction beof the "dying process."
tween euthanasia for the terminally ill
As usually defined, and as defined in and euthanasia for other severely ill peoMissouri (where the Cruzan case arose) ple would have lasted very long.
and in many other states, the terms dyAlthough proponents of voluntary
. ing and terminally ill mean that a pa- euthanasia were defeated in Washington
tient's condition will shortly result in state, they will be back. They tell us they
death regardless of the use of available will soon try again in Oregon, California,
medical treatment. Under this definition and Florida. They will probably again
(and this may surprise a lot of people), propose active euthanasia only for the
neither Karen Ann Quinlan nor Nancy terminally ill. But their arguments outBeth Cruzan was dying or terminally ill. run euthanasia for that limited group.
Quinlan probably could have been
If, as proponents of euthanasia say,
kept alive if her respirator had not been people ought to have the right to conremoved. Indeed, she stayed alive for 9 trol their own destiny-the right to choose
years after it was removed. As for Cruzan, what they regard as the most "humane"
it is generally agreed that if kept on the or "dignified" way to end their livesfeeding tube she might have lived for why should that right be confined to
another 20 or 30 years.
the terminally ill? Why don't these arguOf course, one may say (and many ments apply, at the very least, to nonpeople have) that PVS patients should terminally ill persons who are gravely ill
have their life support disconnected be- or seriously disabled?
cause they "might as well be dead" or
It may be good strategy to limit volthey are "better off dead." (This is the untary euthanasia to the terminally illprincipal reason many people fuvor termi- as a first step-but I am convinced that
nating life-sustaining treatment in cases if and when such a proposal is approved,
like QJtinlan and Cruzan.) But to say euthanasia for the terminally ill will turn
that is to wrestle with the very elusive out to be an intermediate phase in the
question of a life not worth living.
movement toward more and more volIf death is unpreventable-if the best untary euthanasia and then, I am afraid,
that medicine has to offer can postpone nonvoluntary euthanasia. If the modern
death for only a short time-it makes history of the ethics of death and dying
some sense to say that the underlying demonstrates anything, it is that what
illness "caused" the death or that dis- we cannot do-perhaps cannot even think
continuing life support merely permitted seriously about doing-in one step we
death to occur. But when a patient can are often able to do in two or three.
Living will statutes generally demand
be kept alive for many years it is hard
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that a terminal condition be present before the living will becomes effective.
But in response to strong criticism that
such a restriction unduly limits the benefits of such legislation, some states have
greatly relaxed the definition of terminally ill or eliminated the requirement
altogether. The same pressures, I am
afraid, are likely to expand the category
of those eligible for active euthanasia
well beyond the terminally ill.
What is the difference between extraordinary and ordinary means of
life support? Is this distinction likely
to be preserved in the future?
No. In fact, it has pretty much disappeared already. At one time this distinction may have been a helpful tool
of analysis, but participants in the rightto-die debate soon poured into it all the
factors relevant to appropriate moral
decisions, however nonmedical they
might be. As a result, treatment that is
usual, even routine-antibiotics, simple
surgery, intravenous feeding-was called
"extraordinary" or "heroic" in light of
a given patient's condition.
To say, as many did, that a simple
operation to remove an intestinal blockage is a non-obligatory extraordinary treatment when the patient is a Down's
syndrome baby or that the use of antibiotics to combat pneumonia is extraordinary when the patient is senile or
that insulin is extraordinary for a diabetic patient who develops inoperable cancer is circular reasoning. Extraordinary
treatment came to mean treatment that
was considered undesirable or inappropriate in relation to the medical condition of a given patient.
But why was treatment inappropriate
under the circumstance? Evidently it
was because those who called the treatment extraordinary thought there was
no point in keeping the patient alive
under the circumstances. Thus, it became very difficult to distinguish the extraordinary means doctrine from advocacy of passive or negative euthanasia.
Those who think termination of lifesustaining treatment is called for can
simply label the treatment heroic or
extraordinary.
The extraordinary/ordinary means distinction has been severely criticized (see,
eg., President1s Commission for the Study
of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Deciding
to Forego Lifo-Sustaining Treatment 82-89
(1983)) and is now widely rejected. And
rightly so. The distinction became so

spongy and unilluminating that there
was little to be said for retaining it.
But over the years this doctrine performed a function: It confused and seduced us. It led many to believe that
only certain kinds oflife support could
be, and would be, terminated-that disconnecting an unconscious patient's respirator in some vague way constituted
only a very slight and a very limited deviation from our official morality. This
doctrine has moved us down the slippery slope.
You have said that determination of
a patient's condition must be made
by doctors but that whether a patient
should die is a "moral-legal-philosophical-political question" that should
not be left to doctors. The courts are
the place for deciding legal questions.
Should anyone else be involved in the
decision-making process?
Every profession would like to police
itself. Every group (and I include law
faculties as well as police departments
and school boards) resents an "outside"
group looking over its shoulder.
But despite their expertise, we don't
let the police decide for themselves when
they can kill a fleeing felon. Rather we
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say (and rightly so) that this is a legal
policy issue to be decided by the legislature or the courts.
Doctors can tell us whether a person's
condition is incurable or irreversible or
whether a person is in a persistent vegetative state or in some other condition.
But the typical doctor is not a lawyer
or a philosopher or an ethicist. And
deciding whether the life of a severely
ill person is worth living-whether a patient's state of existence is sufficiently
good to justifY any further medical treatment-is not a question that doctors are
uniquely, or even specially, qualified to
answer.
Of course, doctors have been answering
these very questions. That's because deciding these excruciating life-or-death
matters is a "dirty business" -a subject
that neither courts nor legislatures have
been eager to get into. For a long time
the legal system has more or less abdicated
its responsibility and the doctors have
filled the vacuum.
As many have said, this area is primarily one for the legislature, not the courts.
We can't expect our courts to limp along
without getting more guidance than
they have been provided up to now. In
considering and drafting legislation we
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should welcome the input of many
groups-medical ethicists, psychiatrists,
psychologists, philosophers, people from
different religious traditions, all kinds of
health professionals-as well as input
from lawyers.
I can't think of a problem that raises
more fundamental moral, political, and
legal questions than euthanasia. And if
lawyers are not well equipped to play a
large role in grappling with them, who
is? We will not and should not relish
the task. But neither should we shrink
from it.
How is a more conservative Supreme
Court likely to rule in the future in
cases like Cruzan?
Although they did not achieve the result they desired in Cruzan, right-to-die
proponents did secure two significant
victories: The Court seems to have rejected any distinction (l) between the
feeding tube and other forms of life support and (2) between dying or terminally ill patients and those whose conditions have stabilized and who could be
kept alive for many years.
But two of the justices who supported
a right to die have retired, and both of
their replacements will probably join

--,

Chief Justice Rehnquist and the three
justices who sided with him (Kennedy,
Scalia, and White). (Although Justice
O'Connor also joined the chief justice,
her separate concurring opinion really
put her at a considerable distance from
him.)
As a result of the change in the Court's
personnel, the chief justice's avoidance
of the phrase "a right to refuse treatment" (emphasis added), one used by
many state courts, and his preference for
the phrase ''liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment" (emphasis
added) take on added significance.
I share the view of Professor John
Robertson of the University of Texas
School of Law: By avoiding "fundamental rights" language-by declining to
regard a right to refuse treatment as "encompassed by a generalized right of privacy" -the Court indicated that it would
restrict this "liberty interest" on a lesser
showing of need than it would require
if that interest were regarded as a fundamental right. (See Robertson, Cruzan
and the Constitutional Status of Nontreatment Decisionsfor Incompetent Patients, 25
GA. L. REV. 1139, 1174 (1991).)
The "opposite" of the typical rightto-die case has surfaced in Minnesota.
A public hospital sought permission
to remove a respirator from an 87year-old woman in a persistent vegetative state whose family opposed the
request. The hospital said continuing
treatment was not in the woman's
personal or medical interest. The family won; the woman died a day later.
Does a patient have the right to demand unceasing medical treatment in
a hopeless case? Is the outcome of this
case likely to affect outcomes in more
typical right-to-die cases?
A growing number of commentators
are arguing that PVS patients should be
viewed as dead or that the legal definition of death should be expanded to include such persons. A number of people
find this approach appealing-so long as
the family wants the life support to be
terminated. However, many of these
same people become uneasy when the
family wants to keep the patient on life
support.
Suppose a state defines a PVS patient
or a person otherwise permanently unconscious as dead. That would mean
that a hospital could require the termination of life support over the objection
of every close family member.. (I know
of cases where a hospital has done just
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